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Introduction 
 "Religion affects the masses of a billion people".
1
 Jiang Zemin, the former president of 
the People’s Republic of China, understood that religion was an unavoidable issue that needed to 
be addressed in order to promote socialist ideas, unity, and stability. He pushed the need for 
regulation to adapt religion to socialism.
2
 
 China has a great interest in controlling religion in order to protect their State’s political 
sovereignty and longevity. There has long been a fear throughout China that the “western” world 
would use religion in order to infiltrate and subvert China.
3
 In addition, domestically, China 
needs to control religion in order to keep their nation stable and protect the status quo. For 
example, throughout China’s history, there had been rebellions caused by charismatic religious 
leaders who would use their leadership to appeal to the masses and organize.
4
 One such leader 
was Hong Xiquan, who led the Taiping Rebellion, one of China’s most blood rebellions.5 One of 
the more infamous disruptions occurred during the Qing Dynasty, when the White Lotus (a 
Buddhist sect) revolted against the government. 
                                                            
1 Pitman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China, 174 China Quarterly, 317, 321 (2003). This is 
a view that is held my other top leaders. For example, Zhu Weiqun, another previous member of the Central 
committee stated, “increasing religious practice among party members is ‘threatening our unity and national 
leadership.’” See, Top Chinese Official Speaks Out Against Rise of Religion. Morning Star, December 19, 2011. Can 
be accessed at http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/index.php/content/view/full/113315. [accessed April 24, 2013] 
2 China’s New Regulation on Religious Affairs: A Paradigm Shift?, Before the Congressional Executive on the 
Commission on China, 109th Cong. 7 (2005). 
3 Human Rights Watch, China: State Control of Religion, October 1, 1997, can be accessed at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/10/01/china-state-control-religion [accessed March 4, 2013] 
4 Robert Bejesky, Falun Gong & Re-education Through Labor: Traditional Rehabilitation for the “Misdirected” to 
Protect Societal Stability Within China’s Evolving Criminal Justice System, Columbia Jrn’l of Asian Law, 148, 159 
(2004). 
5 Carrie Gracie, Hong Xiuquan: The rebel who thought he was Jesus's brother, BBC News, October 17, 2012, can be 
accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19977188 [accessed April 24, 2013]. 
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China’s ideology is centered on the idea that the need of the state trumps the needs of the 
individual. With this in mind, the government sought to balance the rights of the individual and 
the rights of the collective. However, when the government grants new freedoms –in this case 
religion—the country could be destabilized through the practice of these rights. For instance, 
China wants to suppress the Tibetan Buddhists because they give their loyalty to the Dalai Lama; 
and, China oppresses Islam followers in Xinjiang because some Muslims there use religion to 
resist political authority.
6
 
 For those reasons, the Communist Party of China (CCP) does not promote religion per se; 
however, over the years, they have become more liberal. The CCP issued a summary of their 
policy on religion in 1982 through "Document 19". 
7
This document detailed the CCP’s basic 
policy, as one to respect and protect freedom of religion. However, this document only 
authorized five religions: “Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism”.8 
Although claiming to support religious freedom, the government began to see the need to bring 
religion under control due to the sheer amount of religious adherents.
9
 For example, from 1987 
to 1989 there were four riots, in Lahsa, caused by social unrest in Tibet. Tibet wanted political 
autonomy from the People’s Republic of China and the Dhali Lama went to the United States in 
order to plead for autonomy; spurred by the Dhali Lama’s action in the United States, some 
monks revolted in efforts to show support for the Dhali Lama’s cause.10 Such fear of the 
religious adherents led, in 1991, to the creation of Document 6.
11
 Document 6 increased 
regulatory control on matters regarding religion by limiting activities in support of religion, such 
                                                            
6 See generally Potter, supra note 1, at 321. 
7 Mickey Spiegel, Human Rights Watch/Asia, Freedom of Religion in China, 43 (1992). 
8 MacInnis, Religion in China Today, 385-410 (Orbis Books, 1st ed., 1989). 
9  Potter, supra note 5, at 320. 
10 Melvyn Goldstein, Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question, The Atlantic Council Of 
The United States' Occasional Paper, 72, 77-79 (1995). 
11 Spiegel, supra note 6, at 49. 
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as fund-raising and recruitment.
12
 Furthermore, in 1997 the State Council issued the "White 
Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China"; The CCP stressed the point of adapting religion 
to society.
13
 "Adapt to society” meant that religion needed adhere to law and the socialist 
belief.
14
 
 Members of religious organizations that did not adhere to society and law were subdued 
under the pretext that they were a threat to national security. One such group that has come under 
very hard oppression, during the last twenty years, is the Falun Gong. In the attempts to 
punish/detain those associated with the Falun Gong, the government resorted to a detainment 
system called re-education through labor (RETL). In recent years, the Chinese government has 
been under enormous pressure from the international committee to abolish their RETL system, 
for breach of various human rights abuses. Because of these external pressures, there have been 
rumors, that sometime this year (2013) the Chinese government will abolish RETL.
15
 
 However, abolishing the RETL will not give Falun Gong practitioners the freedom they 
desire, nor curb the abuses that they fear. This paper will focus on the Falun Gong and how they, 
even without the RETL, will be subject to detainment by three methods, and that the best method 
to possible help these members stems from creating judicial autonomy. This paper will be 
divided into six sections: 1) the background on Falun Gong and the beginning to their 
persecution; 2) background and history of the RETL; 3) criminal law and how it is utilized 
toward the Falun Gong; 4) brainwashing detention centers; 5) psychiatric abuse on the Falun 
Gong; and, 6) the need for judicial autonomy rather than a sole focus on banning administrative 
                                                            
12Id. at 8-13. 
13 White Paper-Freedom of Religious Belief in China, October 1997, can be accessed at http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/zjxy/t36492.htm. [(February 26, 2013).  
14 Id. 
15 Human Rights Watch, China: Fully Abolish Re-Education through Labor, Human Rights, January 8, 2013, can be 
accessed at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/08/china-fully-abolish-re-education-through-labor [accessed March 
23, 2013]. 
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detention. The government should focus on the rule of law by having the judiciary play a larger 
role in enforcing laws and regulations, as well as limiting the powers of the police 
Falun Gong 
Falun Gong was founded in 1992 by Li Honghzhi. This group was part of a movement 
called the “qigong boom” that occurred in the 1980’s.16 The “Qigong” movement was so popular 
that in 1986 the PRC established a state run association called the China Qigong Scientific 
Research Association (CQSRA).
17
 Falun Gong was subsequently credited on August 1993.
18
Out 
of all the accredited members under the CQSRA, the Falun Gong (Falun Dafa) was one of the 
more popular members.
19
  
Falun Gong is influenced by teachings of both Buddhism and Daoism; members focus on 
“cultivating energy” in order to improve one’s health and to cure one’s illnesses.20 However 
under Li’s guidance, the primary practice of the Falun Gong shifted from methods of cultivating 
energy to methods of gaining salvation. 
21
 It was written in Zhuan Falun, a book written by Li, 
that one could achieve salvation if they followed the three principles of “Truthfulness, 
Compassion, and Forbearance (Zen-Shan-Ren).” 22 
However, in the early 90’s, the practice of qigong began to decline and the government 
began to harden their policies against qigong groups; with these factors against him, Li 
announced the cease of their domestic training on September 1994 and overseas training in 
                                                            
16 Michael J. Greenlee, A King Who Devours His People: Jiang Zemin and the Falun Gong Crackdown: A 
Bibliography, 34 Int’l J. Legal Info. 566, 557 (2006).  
17 David Ownby, A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty, 
6Nova Religio 223, 233-34 (2003). 
18 James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing, 171 China Q. 
643, 652 (1999). 
19 Id. 
20 Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days, 3, (Yale U. Press) (2004). 
21 Lee Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun Fajie The Law of Zhuan Falun Explained, 8, can be accessed at 
http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/pdf/zfl_fajie.pdf 
22 Id. 
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1995.
23
 On November of 1996, the Falun Gong filed for an official withdrawal from the CQSRA, 
and was terminated.
24
 They failed to reclassify themselves because the government would not 
approve their plea to reclassify as a non-religious academic organization, and by December 1997 
the Falun Gong claimed that they had disbanded.
25
 However, even after the “supposed” 
disbandment the government found that in 1999 there were as many as 39 main stations, 1,900 
guidance stations, 28,263 practice sites nation-wide. 
26
   
Crackdown of Falun Gong 
The most official confrontation against the Falun Gong started on April 11, 1999. The 
Teenager Science and Technology Outlook magazine spoke out against the Falun Gong members 
and called them “bogus”. 27 The magazine would not retract their statement, so on April 11, 
6,000 members staged a protest outside the magazines office. 
28
 As the police were calming the 
situation, they arrested some followers, and in response, on April 25, 1999 more than 10,000 
practitioners gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the CCP’s leadership compound in Beijing. 29 
This demonstration surprised the Chinese government, and on June 20, 1999 the 
government began to formally arrest Falun Gong members. 
30
 It was reported that 5,000 to 6,000 
members were arrested within the first couple of days.
31
 The government officially banned the 
Falun Gong, labeling them as a cult, on June 22, 1999. 
32
 With this ban, the government forbade 
the practice and encouragement of the Falun Gong, distribution of materials related to the Falun 
                                                            
23 Tong, supra note 17, at 640. 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 641. 
26 China Aid Association, Differences Between Cults and Religions, 1/no. 3 Chinese Law & Religious Monitor, 27 
(2005) 
27 He Zouziu, I Do Not Approve of Teenagers Practicing Qigong, 32 Chinese L. & Govt. 95, 97 (1999). 
28 Chang, supra note 19, at 6. 
29 Benjamin Penny, The Life and Time of Li Hongzhi: Falun Gong and Religious Biography, 175 China Q. 643, 643 
(2003). 
30 Tong, supra note 19, at 814. 
31 Id.at 815 
32 Erin Chlopak, China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong, 9 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief, 17 (2001). 
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Gong, and organizing demonstrations. Then on July 29, the government issued a warrant for the 
arrest of Li Hongzhi along with a $6,000 reward for those who would provide information that 
led to his arrest.
33
 
A broader sweeping arrest campaign, against the Falun Gong, began on October 1999. 
The campaign began with the broadening of the criminal code that criminalized cults.
34
 Although 
most of the members were not prosecuted criminally, many were sent to administrative 
detentions known as the RETL. 
35
 
RETL 
Re-education through labor (RETL) was developed in 1955 through the 1955 Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Directive.
36
 The original purpose of the RETL was to catch those who 
committed minor criminal offenses that were not serious enough to be treated as a criminal 
offence. Although RETL was labeled a “quasi-imprisonment”, the government treated it as if it 
were a prison. 
37
In some provinces RETL offenders were attached to prisons in sub-units, and in 
all provinces RETL offenders and criminal defendants were both forced to work farmland under 
police control, making it hard to distinguish one from another.
38
   
In 1957, the State Council passed the Decision on RETL which “enlarged the scope of 
[RETL]” and “clarified the scope of [its] application”.39 The use of RETL could now be used 
against people in one of these four categories: counter revolutionaries; unemployed people who 
                                                            
33 Chang, supra note 19, at 6.  
34 Judicial Explanation on Crimes by Cults, China Daily, November 1, 1999, can be accessed at http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36568.htm [accessed March 14, 2013]. 
35 Michael J. Greenlee, supra note 15, at 563.  
36 Fu Hualing, Re-education Through Labor in Historical Perspective, 184 China Q. 3 (2005). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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constantly commit minor offenses; former state employees who were expelled and could not get 
a job; and employees who caused disturbances at work by not doing their assignments.
40
 
Right after passing the Decision on RETL the Chinese government launched the anti-
rightist campaign. 
41
For example, from 1957-1960 in Shandong’s RETL Institution out of the 
16,695 detainees, 9,858 were political offenders.
42
 
During the Cultural Revolution operations of the RETL was in “a state of near suspension” 
because use of it was seen as being soft on the enemy.
43
 
However, in 1979, RETL was restored through the enactment of the State Council 
Supplementary Rules on RETL.
44
 With the reinstatement of RETL the government shifted their 
focus on the use of RETL to petty criminals instead of the usual counterrevolutionaries. For 
example, in Shandong First Laojiao Institution, in 1980, 90% of the offenders committed 
criminal offences such as “theft, fighting in public, or deception”. 45 Aside from the shift of the 
targeted group, the most significant development, at this time, was the implementation of the two 
to three year term limit for RETL.
46
 Furthermore, in 1988, RETL was finally separated from the 
prison system and the police and put it in the hands of the Ministry of Justice.
47
 
                                                            
40 Edward J. Epstein, Legal Document and Materials on Administrative Detention in the People’s Republic of China, 
Chinese law and Government, Vol. 27, no. 5, 61 (1994). 
41 Hualing, supra note 35, at 816. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 818. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 819. 
46Human Rights in China, Reeducation Through Labor (RTL): A Summary of Regulatory Issues and Concerns, 
HRIC, February 2001, can be accessed at http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-RTL.pdf 
[accessed March 14, 2013]. 
47 Id. 
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Beginning 1979, the government began expand the list of offences, through regulations, 
that allowed the use of RETL; one such example is a regulation enacted in 1983 that made RETL 
open to people who have a “membership in cults or secret societies”.48  
According to Amnesty International, prisoners in RETL are subject to all kinds of abuse 
and torture.
49
 Couples Zhang Lianying and Niu Jinping, were sent to the RETL for practicing 
Falun Gong. They recanted stories of their torture to a reporter, after they entered the United 
States. The wife said that she was suspect to all kinds of various beating. When she would say 
“Falun Gong is good” officers would beat her in the face with a plank and tie her up.50Her 
husband was taken to a different center where, as he first entered, was subject to electrical 
shocks.
51
 There are also many reports of prisoners being force fed, sleep deprived, and 
brainwashed.
52
 
But now, there are rumors of RETL finally coming to an end, with its long 58 year 
history. However, even without this system the Falun Gong members still have much to fear. 
They are in similar situations; the only thing that will change is the form of punishment. For 
example, Falun Gong members could more likely be subject to criminal prosecution. 
 
 
 
                                                            
48Hualing, supra note 35, at 820. 
49 Amnesty International, China: Abolishing "Re-education through Labour" and other forms of punitive 
administrative detention: An opportunity to bring the law into line with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,  May 12, 2006, ASA 17/016/2006, can be accessed  at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/447b18ee4.html [accessed 17 April 2013] 
50 Shaun Tandon, Fleeing China: Couple Urge Help for Falun Gong, AFP, Apr, 23, 2011, can be accessed at 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hzH5RDTjkIfFXeFt1eRlDTSWFf8w?docId=CNG.2f5a8fb
dc481f0ab21e58aa4d496db7e.161. [accessed March 19 2013].   
51 Id. 
52 Bu Dongwei, Blog: My Life Inside a Chinese Labor Camp, Amnesty International, December 7, 2009, Can be 
accessed at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/blog-my-life-inside-chinese-labor-camp-20091207.  
[accessed March 19, 2013]. 
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Article 300 and 296 and use of Criminal Sanctions 
 One of the criminal laws that Falun Gong practitioners could be held to is Article 296 of 
China’s Code of Criminal Law (CL). Article 296 states: 
Where an assembly, a procession or a demonstration is held with no application made in 
accordance with the provisions of law or no permission granted for the application or 
where it is held not in accordance with the time for start and stop, venue and routes 
permitted by the competent authorities, and the order of dismission is disobeyed and 
public order seriously disrupted, the persons who are in charge and the persons who are 
directly responsible for the assembly, procession or demonstration shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public 
surveillance or deprivation of political rights.
53
 
 
However, it is more likely that members will be prosecuted under Article 300 of the 
Chinese CL.   
Article 300 of the CL was enacted on March 14, 1997. This code states: 
Whoever forms or uses superstitious sets or secret societies or strange religious 
organizations or uses superstition to undermine the implementation of the laws and 
administrative rules and regulations of the State shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than three years but no more than seven years; if the 
circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to a fixed term imprisonment of 
not less than seven years.
54
 
 
 Following the protests of the Falun Gong that took place in April, the People’s Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Prosecutorate issued an interpretation of Article 300 on October 1999.
55
 
In the interpretation, the government listed six ways that one could violate Section 1 of Article 
300: I) gather people to disrupt the work of the government; II) assemble or demonstrate 
members to disrupt public places; III) continuing activities of banned groups; IV) organize others 
                                                            
53 Wei Luo, The 1997 Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China, 160 (1998). 
54 Id. at 161 (1998). 
55 Judicial Explanation on Crimes by Cults, China Daily, November 1, 1999, can be accessed at 
http://www.cesnur.org/testi/falun_005.htm [accessed March 20, 2013].  
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to stop their legal obligations; V) publish, print, distribute publication and print symbols of the 
banned sect; VI) other activities that violate law or regulations.
56
  
Furthermore, the offense is considered serious, for purpose of sentencing, if it meets any 
of the following four criteria: I) set up organization or recruiting members; II) collaborating with 
overseas groups; III) publishing large amounts of banned material and banned sect symbols; and 
IV) instigating others to violate state law or regulation.
57
 
In addition, a person can be charged under Section 2 and 3 of Article 300 if they use the 
banned sect (Falun Gong) to cause death. Some examples of violations under Section 2 and 3 
would be fasting, inflicting wounds upon one’s self, self-immolation, and stopping someone 
from taking medication—all practices of the Falun Gong.58 
With the conviction rate in China being 99% there is little hope that Falun Gong 
members would be able to leave unscathed. 
59
It also doesn’t help that the October 1999 
interpretation of Article 300 seems to be geared specifically toward the Falun Gong. For example, 
Section 1 of Article 300 targets any sects or religious groups who publicly gather or assembly.
60
 
This interpretation of the Section 1 seems to attack Falun Gong members in efforts to restrain 
any protests that resemble the one on April 25, 1999.  
Furthermore, after the interpretation, it becomes a serious crime when Falun Gong 
members collaborate with overseas groups.
61
 This part of the article targets the members so that 
they cannot contact or work with any of the members overseas, such as practitioners in America. 
                                                            
56 Id.   
57 Id.  
58 Ian Dobson, The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1997): Real Change or Rhetoric?, 11 Pac. Rim 
L. & Poli’y J. 1, 26, (2002); There are questions as to whether self-immolation is a Falun Gong practice and many 
practitioners state that it is not; however, there was an incident with the Falun Gong burning themselves at 
Tiananmen Square on 2001. 
59 Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and Into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but Misguided Recommendations to 
Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 991, 1034 (2004). 
60 Supra note 55.  
61 Id. 
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Additionally, the court specifically targets Falun Gong members with the interpretation that 
states that members cannot lead other members to inflict self- harm. The court went on to list 
specific Falun Gong practices that met such a rule, such as fasting and not taking medicine.
62
 In 
all, it is arguable that that this interpretation creates ten different offences.
63
The government 
responded by saying that it was clarifying the rule and not creating distinct regulations.
64
 
The court further expanded its interpretations on Article 300 on June 2001.
65
 The 
interpretation not only expanded the application of Article 300 but had the lower courts read 
Article 300 to oppose Falun Gong.
66
 For example, the new interpretation banned the use of cults 
to endanger national security, help members commit suicide/ acts of deformity, and spread 
publication.
67
 
However, in reality only a small portion of Falun Gong practitioners are taken to trial. In 
1999, out of 2,000 members who were arrested and detained only 40 cases have been tried.
68
 
Furthermore, in Jiangsu Province, in 2010, out of 117 members, who were detained, only 17 
members were taken to trial.
69
 In addition, from 1999 to 2011 out of 4,017 arrests only 140 were 
sentenced to prison, around the Shijiazhuang City area. 
70
  Even if RETL is abolished, the 
government will not overlook the Falun Gong practitioners ― evidenced by the courts broad 
interpretation of Article 300. In the end, Falun Gong practitioners may receive longer detainment 
                                                            
62 Dobson, supra note 58, at 25. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Explanation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Some Issues Concerning 
the Specific Application of Laws When Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Exploiting Heresy Organization, 
October 9, 1999, can be accessed at http://www.novexcn.com/sup_peop_ct_heretical_cult.html [accessed April 1, 
2013] 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 James Tong, supra note 68, at 816. 
69 Statistical Summary: Falun Gong Practitioners Persecuted in Jiangsu Province in 2010, Clearwisdom, January 
25, 2011, can be accessed, http://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2011/1/25/122859.html [accessed April 20, 2013] 
70 Statistics and Analysis on the Persecution of Falun Gong Practitioners in Hebei Province, Clearwidsom, March 
25, 2011, can be accessed http://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2011/3/25/124035.html [accessed April 20, 2013] 
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periods because of the ban of RETL. For example, the maximum sentence someone can get from 
the RETL is four years.
71
 However, under Article 300 many of the defendants will be eligible for 
seven year sentences. 
72
 
Since the conviction rate in China is somewhere up in the 99% range, many would feel 
that it is in their best interest to confess, in hopes to be treated more leniently.
73
 This problem is 
made difficult by the fact that many of the members are not “first-time” offenders.74 Since many 
are “repeat-offenders”, they will most likely be given a higher sentence.75 
 
Effects of the 2001 Tiananmen Square Incident and Other Trials 
One of the most infamous cases where Falun Gong members were charged under Article 
300 arose from an incident that occurred at Tiananmen Square on January 23, 2001. 
76
 On the 
eve of Chinese New Year seven Falun Gong members traveled to Tiananmen Square in order to 
protest the government’s mistreatment of the Falun Gong. At Tiananmen Square five members 
set themselves ablaze, but due to police intervention two of the original five members survived. 
Five of the members went to trial and was sentenced in mid-2001. Here, the applicable law was 
the court’s 2001 interpretation of Article 300. The interpretation stated that it was illegal for a 
cult/sect in order to help members commit suicide or self-harm.  
All members were found guilty and were sentenced to various degrees, all sentences 
being higher than RETL’s 4 year limitation. The person considered the mastermind, Liu Yunfang, 
                                                            
71 Hualing, supra note 35, at 817. 
72 Luo, supra note 53, at 161. 
73 Randall Peerenboom, supra note 59, at 1034. 
74 Id.at1034. 
75 Id. 
76 CNN Report, Tiananmen Tense after Fiery Protest, Jan 24, 2001, can be accessed at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070222110517/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/24/asia.falun.0
3/.[accessed March 24, 2013].    
12 
 
was given a life sentence. 
77
Three members were given sentences ranging from seven to fifteen 
years.
78
  
Furthermore, the first case brought against the Falun Gong was for defying Article 300’s 
provision on obtaining and spreading Falun Gong material. The trial took place November 30, 
1999, and the defendants were given sentences ranging two to fourteen years. 
79
 Even here, just 
for spreading pamphlets and books the courts gave them a high sentence. 
In a second case, that occurred a month later on December 26, 1999 four members of the 
Falun Gong were given sentences ranging from seven to eighteen years. The defendants were 
also charged under the broad interpretation of Article 300: obstruction of justice, causing death, 
obtaining State secrets.
80
 
When balancing the RETL with the outcomes of such cases, it seems like the abolishment 
of the RETL is, if one at all, a hollow victory. The treatment of the stigmatized members of 
society will not change. In addition, evidenced in these three cases, the government is on a 
crusade against the Falun Gong and is using their interpretive powers in order to bring in a 
varying array of charges under the broad umbrella of Article 300. More often than not, Falun 
Gong members will be subject to prison sentences exceeding detainment time under RETL. 
Sentencing is not the only concern. Another backlash to the practitioners is that they are 
in danger of being stigmatized as a convict for committing a petty offence. With this 
stigmatization the now convicts will face greater alienation and discrimination from society.
81
 
This may actually lead to a never ending cycle of “crime time in prison, release, and then more 
                                                            
77 Id. 
78 One escaped punishment because she confessed and had only a minor role in the event. 
79 Imprisonment for Four Falun Gong Cult Members, Zinhua News Agency, Nov. 12, 1999, can be accessed 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/special/fagong/1999111600F103.html [accessed March 15, 2013] 
80 Key Falun Gong Cult Members Sentenced, China Daily, 1 (1999) 
81 Randall Peerenboom, supra note 59, at 1034.  
13 
 
crime”.82 Furthermore, for members beyond the reach of criminal sanctions there are other forms 
of detention/punishment that could be brought against them 
Torture and the “610” Office 
 Criminal sanctions are not the only problem the Falun Gong members need to fear.  In 
fact, there are many other forms of detention facilities throughout China; these facilities are run 
by the 610 office. These temporary brainwashing centers are the most commonly used methods 
for dealing with the Falun Gong. In 2001, 50,000 members were held in these temporary 
detention centers as compared to 10,000 in the RETL.
83
Similar to the RETL, Falun Gong 
members are subject to all sort of torture, including sleep deprivation, beatings, and 
brainwashing.
84
 
 The 610 office was created by the CCP Central Committee (the most powerful group in 
China) on June 1999. 
85
 This office was created to oversee all of the Falun Gong activities; they 
are “above the law, the courts, and the procuratorial centers” and may take any methods 
necessary to have Falun Gong members renounce their faith. 
86The 610 Office’s response to the 
Falun Gong is, “no one is to be spared”. 87 
 Through torture and other methods to first “break” Falun Gong members, the 610 office 
gained notoriety among Falun Gong members. They would use any methods to have people 
renounce their practice. Active members are taken to the RETL first, not as punishment, but as a 
                                                            
82 Id. 
83 Kelly A. Thomas, Falun Gong: An Analysis of China’s National Security Concerns, Pac. Rim. Law. & Policy 
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way to break them into submission through constant beatings and labor.
88
 After torture, Falun 
Gong practitioners are taken to their local “brainwashing center” and detained until they are 
rehabilitated. Similar to the RETL, this is not a criminal sanction but an administrative detention. 
There are no checks on this body and the system is left up to the whim of the police officers in 
charge. 
 A practitioner is considered rehabilitated when they produce three statements to the 610 
office: “a letter of repentance, a guarantee never again to practice Falun Gong, and a list of 
names and addresses of all family members, friends and acquaintances who are practitioners”. 89 
They then have to complete and prove that they are rehabilitated by joining in steps to “transform” 
fellow practitioners.
90
 
 Stories of Falun Gong members going through the “brainwashing”, initiated by the 610 
office are all very similar in nature. What the 610 office calls brainwashing is called torture by 
those who have had to endure.  For example, a man by the name of Zhong Zhenfu, from 
Shandong Province, was arrested on May 4, 2008. 
91
He alleged that when he refused to reveal 
any information regarding the Falun Gong, the police poured boiling water over his neck and 
body. 
92
Later, he further alleges that they shackled him and put him in a metal cage where they 
tormented him while forcing other inmates to do the same.
93
 Another example of tortured 
members can be seen through the experience of Jiang Yunhong and Lin Xiaoquan. 
94
They allege 
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that they were deprived of sleep and beaten while handcuffed to a chair. 
95
Other horrors of 
torture are evidenced through oral accounts of ex-610 office officers, such as Hao Fengjun.
96
 In 
one account Hao states:  
In the beginning of 2002, they authority started arresting people involved in the "103" 
case. In one day, 79 Falun Gong practitioners were arrested and other two escaped. One 
of the escaped practitioners was a 13 year-old girl named Xu Ziao. This girl's mother, 
Sun Ti, was arrested and little Xu hence became homeless at the age of 13. One night in 
Feb 2002, I received a call asking me to go back to work and accompany a Falun Gong 
practitioner to see a doctor. I rushed to work and drove with a female officer to the prison 
of the Nankai Branch of Tianjin Public Security Bureau. When we arrived at the prison 
located at Erwei Rd., Nankai District, I saw Sun Ti sat on a table in an interrogation room. 
Sun's eyes were so swollen because of the beating. The police who interrogated Sun was 
Mr. Mu Ruili, captain of the 2nd division of the 610 Office of the Bureau of State 
Security. Mu was holding a steel rod (0.6 inch in diameter) with screw thread stained 
with blood. There was a hi-voltage electric baton sitting on the table. As we entered the 
room, we asked Mu to leave. Sun burst into tears and was going show us the injuries. I 
volunteered to leave the room since she was a woman. Sun stopped me and showed me 
her back. I was terribly shocked. Almost her entire back turned black and there were two 
cuts about 8 inches long with blood coming out.
97
 
   
In addition to torture, they are bombarded with anti-Falun Gong propaganda, day in and 
day out. 
98
 Practitioners like Ms. Liu Ying recalls that she was forced to listen to anti- Falun 
Gong propaganda every day from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., and 2:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.   
 In the end, many practitioners break and sign a prewritten document denouncing their 
practice of Falun Gong. Furthermore many end up in the hospital or die. The worst aspect of 
these detention centers are that there are no guidelines limiting the actions of the 610 office. 
They are more likely to get in trouble for allowing a practitioner to make it to Beijing than killing 
a practitioner during detainment.
99
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Psychiatric Hospital 
  Beginning in the 1950’s, the Soviet Union introduced forensic psychology to 
China, and it became highly popular.
100
 The reason for the popularity was that psychiatric 
practitioners did not need to fear the government anymore. Before the introduction of forensic 
psychology the government targeted many psychiatric practitioners for having a “bourgeois 
ideology”. 101But with the introduction of “forensic psychiatry, the psychiatric professionals 
could practice psychiatry without fear of reprisals.  
Since the introduction of the forensic psychiatry, there were three categories of abuse that 
China committed. These three categories are “hypo-diagnosis”, “hyper-diagnosis”, and severe 
medical negligence. 
102
 The most important category, in case of the Falun Gong, is the second 
case. Hyper-diagnosis is when the psychiatrists over-report people who are not in fact mentally 
ill; this is the category that the Falun Gong members fall under today.
103
 
 During the Cultural Revolution, there was immense amount of pressure put on the 
psychiatrists to practice under the methodology of socialism rather than the science of truth.
104
 
The use of forensic psychology was limited to rule against counter revolutionaries, rather than 
see if a person was actually mentally ill. For example, a prisoner “Mr. C” was held to be insane 
because he was claiming he was sane when conducting his counter-revolutionary actions.
105
 The 
pressures from the government turned psychiatry into a weapon to be used against the counter 
revolutionaries in order to silence them. Rather than be purged or branded a counterrevolutionary 
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themselves many doctors turned against their own conscience and made wrongful evaluations.
106
 
They started to make certain category (counterrevolutionary tendency) of dissident individuals 
per se “dangerously mentally ill” and had them sent to psychiatric institutes.107 
 Following the Cultural Revolution the government created the Ankang to combat the rise 
of mental illness in China. Mental illness had risen from seven per thousand to 10.54 per 
thousand.
108
 In order to combat the mental illness problem the government held the First 
National Public Security Conference on Custody and Treatment of the  
Mentally Ill on June 1987. It was here that the government created a custodial facility for the 
mentally ill. Furthermore in 1995 the police were given broad powers to be able to forcibly 
detain mentally ill patients through Article 14 of the 1995 Law of the People’s Police.  
With the new Ankang centers and broad police powers, the psychiatric hospitals were 
turned into another arsenal in the campaign against the Falun Gong that started in 1999. Even 
now, many practitioners are held, not because they are mentally ill, but because they choose to 
follow Falun Gong. 
Use of Psychiatric Hospitals Against Falun Gong Members 
Since 1999, the government has forced mentally healthy Falun Gong practitioners into 
psychiatric hospitals. 
109
 Some members report that they were admitted, not because they had a 
mental problem, but a political one.
110
 There are no legal procedures in order to admit anyone 
into the psychiatric hospital. Practitioners are easily admitted on the whim of a 610 officer.
111
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The practitioners are held anywhere from a few days to one and a half years.
112
 Many of the 
psychiatric hospitals illegally detain Falun Gong member; these hospitals are found in most of 
the major cities, such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai.
113
  
 The main goals of these psychiatric hospitals are not to only detain members from going 
to Beijing to protest, but also to have them renounce their practice.
114
 The scary thing with the 
psychiatric hospital is that many of the people commit their own family and friends believing 
that they would be treated better due to the nature of the facility. 
115
However, these facilities 
themselves are as harsh as the RETL itself.  
 By late 2000, it has been reported that over 600 Falun Gong members were sent to 
psychiatric hospitals.
116
 In order to rehabilitate, these “patients” are subject to drugs and torture; 
not only that, the abused needs to pay for their board and “treatment”.117 
 Many of those admitted to the hospital are mentally sane. One such patient is Han Jizhen 
who was held in Nanjing Medical Hospital.
118
 Her son accounted that his mother went to Beijing 
to protest the government actions against the Falun Gong. The officers arrested and beat her. 
After, they took her to Nanjing Psychiatric Hospital. There she was told she was sent there not 
because she had a mental problem but because she practiced Falun Gong.
119
 
 Furthermore, there are accounts of practitioners being drugged as means of interrogation 
and torture. The patients are so heavily drugged that it causes many illnesses.
120
In one account 
the practitioner, Jiang Jing, was injected with an unknown drug. She had feeling of dizziness, 
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rapid heartbeat, dryness, and panic. Later on, it was revealed that she was administered a banned 
drug only tested on rabbits. Furthermore, in the rabbit testing, when given in high doses the drug 
caused death.
121
 
 Following the drugging, the practitioners are commonly tortured. Most, if not all, 
practitioners, in the hospitals, are “tightly bound with ropes in very painful positions, beaten and 
shocked with electric batons, deprived of food or sleep, force fed through gastric tubing, and 
shocked with high voltage through acupuncture needles.”122All these are conditions that 
practitioners are subject to whether they are in RETL or other detainment facilities. Similar to the 
RETL, this is not a criminal sanction, and hence there are no legal checks to the use of these 
facilities. 
Possible Better Methods to Curb Detainment: Separation of Judiciary 
A) Judicial Legitimacy 
The reform that China should be seeking is not an abolition of one form of abuse—the 
RETL. However, China should seek to implement change by focusing on their judiciary. They 
need to strengthen the judiciary and have the police prove that detainment is necessary. The best 
way to bring these changes is separating China’s judicial system; this will be the first step for 
China towards judicial legitimacy and recognition of due process. 
The main problem with China is that the Chinese government is “unwilling to enforce 
policies, decisions, regulations, and laws”.123 Just by following their laws the Chinese 
government can curb abuses. China by nature has a “strike hard” approach to their criminal 
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justice system.
124
 However, according to Jerome Cohen, unlike the United States, China has a 
police-dominated criminal law system.
125
 The judiciary should be completely free from outside 
influence to promote justice. However the judiciary in China is not independent but intertwined 
with the Communist Party.
126
 The CCP influences the law through the Central Political and 
Judiciary Committee. 
127
Most, if not all, of the 610 Offices are set up within these committees 
and can steer the judge toward how they should rule.
128
 
In most cases, because of these external influences, the courts make decisions that are 
best for the Communist Party rather than decisions that enforce the law.
129
 One case that shows 
the judiciaries disregard for the law is the case with Fan Qihang. This case came out of a broad 
sweeping arrest campaign of organized crime initiated by Bo Xilai.
130
 The case went all the way 
up to the Supreme People’s Court and evidence was produced showing that Fan was tortured to 
get the confession.
131
 However, the court did not even consider the torture and upheld Fan’s 
death sentence.
132The Communist Party during this time was running the “strike hard” on crime, 
and enforcing the exclusion rule would have threatened this campaign.
133
 
Because the court chose not to enforce their laws regarding exclusion evidence, the court 
passed up the chance to take the first them in legitimize their control and power. The court could 
have taken this opportunity to amend their lack of power and the problem of torture. If the court 
followed the law and used the exclusionary rule to leave out evidence obtained through torture, 
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they could have “indirectly” asserted their power to curb police abuses. It would have served as a 
warning that there would be no more leeway for the police to shortcut their duties by torturing 
defendants. Furthermore, although there is no stare decisis in China, the decision could have 
legitimized the court by showing that they had the authority to stop the prosecutor and police 
from overstepping their bounds and that no one was above the law. With the legitimization of the 
court, China could then provide more due process rights to their citizens. 
A) Due Process. 
The problem with due process in China is caused by the broad police powers and the lack of 
criminal lawyers. For example, the police have broad detention powers given to them by the 
Public Security Administration Punishment Law (PSAPL).
134
 More specifically the law that 
governs the police power to detain the Falun Gong is Article 27 of the PSAPL. 
135
 This article 
allows the police to administratively detain, without judicial interference, for a period up to 15 
days anyone who uses “cults/ religious organizations” in order to have others engage in the cult 
activates or disturb social order by engaging in the name of “religion or qigong”.136 Furthermore 
with all kinds of administrative detention—including RETL— there is no judicial check to curb 
the police abuse of power. 
137
 The reason for the lack of judicial oversight is that they do not 
deem actions punishable under administrative detention important enough to require the 
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assistance of the judiciary. 
138
 This lack of oversight leads to many abuses in power such as 
disappearance of lawyers, torture, and illegal house arrests.
139
 
  Even in China’s psychiatric hospitals, the police are given broad discretion to take 
anyone to the psychiatric hospitals without judicial oversight. Article 14 of the 1995 law of the 
People’s Police states:  
The people's policemen of public security organs may take protective measures to 
restrain a mental patient who seriously endangers public security or other people's 
personal safety. If it is necessary to send the patient to a designated institution or place 
for guardianship, the matter shall be reported for approval to the public security organ of 
a people's government at or above the county level, and his or her guardian shall be 
notified without delay.
140
 
 
There are no provisions in the article that states that the Chinese authorities need to attain 
psychological evaluations for the detained.
141
 The only thing that is required, as stated in the 
article, is that the police officer needs to report the detainment to his superior. This poses many 
problems in that instead of a clear neutral group overseeing this check, the person that allows the 
detainment is one with the same goal and thoughts as the detainer. Furthermore, the lack of the 
judiciary in the process creates the potential for abuse because in cases where the defendant is 
found competent to stand trial, the police can circumvent the judiciary by not bringing criminal 
proceedings and then deciding within themselves how to handle the person in question.
142
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Although this is not a paper to compare China with other countries, it would be beneficial 
for China—if they want to reform this problem—to require checks on the police. Currently, there 
is no leeway from administrative detention except through the Administrative Litigation Law.
143
  
There has been an improvement in the people’s use of the Administrative Litigation Law, 
public security lawsuits rising from 7,863 in 1991 to 13,173 in 2000.
144
 However, the data does 
not reflect fully the thoughts of the people. 
145
 It seems that people are more likely to sue if they 
believe they have no other viable option left.
146
This is evidenced in a survey taken by plaintiffs 
that revealed that 57% sued only because they felt they had no other choice. 
147
 Easily 
summarized, “a private citizen could ‘win once but lose the rest of his life’”. 148 
To stop putting the burden on the detained to “prove his innocence”, China should grant 
the judiciary system power to preempt the police abuse by requiring stricter detainment 
requirements for the police to follow. In the case for psychological health detainment and Article 
14 detainment there is no judicial oversight and it is up to the accused to prove their innocence in 
administrative appeal.  China should implement something similar to the U.S’s warrant system. 
Instead of allowing the police to arbitrarily detain someone for mere suspicion, they should be 
checked on by a neutral entity instead of one of superiors in the public safety organ. The police 
should have to write a detailed report and get it approved from the judiciary, and this can come 
to fruition if courts are able to implement sanctions.  
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 As of now, the courts give sanctions within their own hierarchy for getting cases 
overturned. 
149
  However, if the courts are able to use those kinds of sanctions and enforce them 
on the police, it would be an effective tool. There are many troubles when it is inter-courts. One 
of the problems that Carl Minzner states is that these incentives force the higher judicial 
authorities to” handle a myriad of requests for guidance from lower-level courts”.150 However, a 
wrong in one case can be right in another. It would be great if this incentive creates requests 
from the police to the courts for guidance. This guidance will educate the police and hopefully 
keep them from overstepping their boundaries with handling defendants; this could possibly 
create something similar to the United States equivalent of a warrant. However, for the courts to 
gain this kind of power, they must first separate themselves and become autonomous. 
Conclusion 
If China bans the use of RETL will be more for show than substance. The main problem 
is that the PRC is bent on crushing the Falun Gong. Whether it be criminally or administratively, 
China has done everything from interpreting the laws in a very liberal, “anti-Falun Gong” way to 
using other methods of administrative detention to persecute the practitioners. As this paper 
outlined there are other detainment methods where the government can do anything from 
increase the time you spend in jail to “brainwash” you into submission. Practitioners are drugged, 
beaten, abused, not only through the RETL, but through all the detention facilities. Yes, RETL is 
a horrendous place for practitioners to get sent to. However, it is not, by all means, the worst 
place they can go. The other forms of detainment are all equally as harsh as the RETL, and the 
abolishment of RETL will not make a dent against China’s crusade against the Falun Gong. With 
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one method out we can expect to see various abuses in many other areas to make up for the 
“limb” lost.  
Rather than appeasing the mass by getting rid on one form of detention, China should 
focus on the underlying causes of RETL’s abuse, which are a biased judiciary and an overly 
powerful police. As stated in this paper one possible way to reform will be separating the 
judiciary away from the grasp of the CCP, which in turn could grant the courts more legitimacy. 
The courts legitimacy could then in turn become a powerful check on the police.  
 
